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ADVANCE NOTICE OF PLANT 
CLOSINGS: TOWARD NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION 
Nearly 6500 plants with over one hundred workers closed be-
tween 1969 and 1976.1 This statistic highlights the crisis posed 
by plant closings throughout the United States. Plant closings 
cause hardship at many levels: workers suddenly become unem-
ployed, communities face lower revenues, and the state incurs 
substantial costs in unemployment benefits. Overall, workers 
and their communities may suffer a debilitating loss of spirit.· 
Legislators, consequently, have introduced plant closing bills in 
many state legislatures and the United States Congress. 2 
One reform often mentioned would require businesses to give 
notice in advance of a plant closing. Indeed, some authors call 
these "advance notice" provisions the key to all other plant clos-
' D. BIRCH, THE Jos GENERATION PROCESS 12 (1979). This figure comes from a calcula-
tion based on plant "deaths": [(total percent of firms that "died," which employed 101-
500 workers) multiplied by (total number of firms with 101-500 workers)] plus [(total 
percent of firms that died, which employed 501 or more workers) multiplied by (total 
number of firms with 501 or more workers)]. ·The total number of firms that have less 
than 100 workers and that died between 1969 and 1976 is approximately 1,062,130. How-
ever, there is much discussion and controversy over figures concerning plant closings. See 
note 5 infra. 
Plant closing research is continually growing. I thank Dr. Jeanne Gordus at the Insti-
tute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan and Wayne State Uni-
versity, and Mrs. JoAnn Sokkar and Mrs. Mabel Webb at the Industrial Relations Li-
brary, University of Michigan Graduate School of Business, for keeping me informed. 
• The following plant closing bills were introduced in Congress in the last three years: 
H.R. 565, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 7315, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 2400, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 1608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 5040, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1979); S. 1609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1058, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979); H.R. 3187, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); and H.R. 2203, 96th Cong., 1st Sees. 
(1979). None of these bills passed the Senate or the House of Representatives. 
The following plant closing bills were pending in state legislatures as of September 8, 
1980: 
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ing reforms.3 This article advocates the adoption of national leg-
islation requiring advance notice for plants closed or relocated 
for ostensibly economic reasons.' Part I discusses the magnitude 
of the plant closing problem, focusing upon the costs associated 
with such closings, the types of assistance available for termi-
nated workers, and the inadequacies of current relief efforts. 
Parts II and III examine the arguments for and against requiring 
advance notice of plant closings, and conclude that such a re-
quirement represents sound public policy. Part IV proposes a 
complete model advance notice statute. The model statute es-
tablishes minimum requirements for a viable advance notice sys-
tem, takes account of the different levels of hardship caused by 
these closings, and does not require advance notice when it 
would excessively harm the employer. The adoption of this arti-
cle's model statute would mitigate substantially the crisis posed 
by the numerous plant closings across the United States. 
Alaska H.B. 274 
Calif. S.B. 1494; AJR-70 
Conn. s. 334 
Del. H. 305; H. 887 
Ill. H.B. 2768; H.B. 3567 
Iowa H.B. 365; s. 2160 
Maine L.D. 1333 
Mass. H. 6791; S.B. 96 
Mich. H.B. 5104; s. 868 
N.J. A. 1054; s. 1135 
N.Y. S.B. 5927 
Ohio H.B. 968; S.B. 188 
Ore. S.B. 729 
Penn. H.B. 2267; H.B. 1251 
R.I. H. 7796; s. 2248 
S.D. s. 40 
W. Va. s. 344 
None of these state bills have passed their respective legislatures. See National Assoca-
tion of Manufacturers, Plant Closings State Status (rev. Sept. 3, 1980) (unpublished ta-
ble from National Assoc. of Manufacturers) (on file at the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform). However, plant closing laws have been passed in Maine, ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 26, § 625-B (Supp. 1980-81), and in Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 109.07 (West 
1975). 
• See, e.g., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES: THE CONSE-
QUENCES 011 PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT 266 (1980) [hereinafter cited as BLUESTONE & 
HARRISON]. 
• The National Labor Relations Act covers the "runaway shop" problem (i.e., plants 
being relocated because of anti-union animus) and closings due to-lockouts or strikes. 
Hence, this article will not discuss union-related plant closings. See generally R. SMITH, 
L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 161-90, 
574-75 (6th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as SMITH ET. AL.]. 
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I. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PLANT CLOSING PROBLEM 
Only two out of every three firms that in 1969 employed be-
tween one hundred and five hundred workers remained in exis-
tence by 1976. Similarly, only three out of every four firms 
which in 1969 employed over five hundred workers persisted in 
1976. 6 In human terms, these plant closings may have resulted in 
over 2.5 million lost jobs per year during this period.6 
Plants close for many reasons. The entire company may be 
failing, a certain product may no longer be in demand, or the 
plant and its machinery may have become obsolete. The money 
made from the plant's output may not reach the· company's de-
sired profit level.' Finally, plants may close because of a trouble-
some workforce or anti-union hostility. 
A. The Costs Associated With Plant Closings 
Whatever their cause, plant closings invariably result in hard-
• D. BIRCH, THE JoB GENERATION PROCESS 12 (1979). Although plant closings get con-
siderable publicity, the United States government does not record the number of plant 
closings per year or the number of jobs Jost due to plant closings per year. Consequently, 
researchers in this area usually rely on Dun & Bradstreet records. Dun & Bradstreet is a 
corporation that specializes in providing business information. Since plant closings occur 
when a business closes or relocates its plant, the Dun & Bradstreet terms "plant deaths" 
and "plant outmigrations" refer to plant closings. Although these data do not accurately 
reflect the plant closing situation, they represent the best available statistics. 
Dun & Bradstreet figures only reflect (1) the businesses for which a credit rating has 
been requested by other firms, banks, or government agencies, (2) those firms willing to 
announce a closing, (3) those closing firms the local Dun & Bradstreet office finds out 
about, and (4) only businesses that move within the United States. The resulting inaccu-
racies tend to undercount the actual number of plant closings. On the other hand, plants 
which continue operating but with new ownership may be counted as a death and then 
as an opening, which would tend to overcount the actual number of closings. See BLUE-
STONE & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 24-25, 48. 
Further, researchers cannot discern any trends from the data. Dun & Bradstreet ex-
panded its coverage of plant operations between the 1969-72 time period and the 1972-74 
time period, and again between the 1972-74 time period and the 1974-76 time period. 
See BLlJESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 286 n.5. 
• BLUESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 59. Other researchers, however, not using 
Dun & Bradstreet data have estimated that plant closings eliminate 400,000 jobs per 
year. See, e.g., T. Kochan, The Federal Role in Economic Dislocations: Toward A Better 
Mix of Public and Private Efforts 13 (October 1979) (unpublished paper prepared for the 
staff of the U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Policy, Evaluation, 
and Research) (the paper does not represent the position of the U.S. Dep't of Labor) 
[hereinafter cited as Kochan]; H. Gilman, The Economic Costs of Worker Dislocation 
(July 31, 1979) (unpublished paper prepared for a seminar on Economic Dislocation and 
Public Policy conducted by the National Commission for Employment Policy). 
7 See P. JARLEY, RESPONSE TO MAJOR LAYOFFS AND PLANT CLOSINGS 72 (1980). Sub-
profitable plants are perfect candidates for purchase by employees and communities. 
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ship to workers, the community, and the state. Studies have 
shown that many workers face immediate loss in income,8 pro-
longed unemployment,9 lower earnings in their ·next job,10 poorer 
health, 11 . a higher rate of suicide, 12 increased alcoholism, 13 and 
mental depression.14 The typical worker in a plant shutdown is 
in his late forties with high seniodty, relatively high earnings, 
specialized skills, and strong ties to family and commu-
nity111-factors that constrain mobility,18 make it hard to find a 
job,17 and cause greater loss from a plant closing.18 
• See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 372 
(1979). According to the Report, state unemployment benefits average $78.60 per week 
across the U.S. This sum is meager, especially for those workers with families . 
• See, e.g., R. ARONSON & R. McKERsIE, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PLANT SHUT-
DOWNS IN NEW YORK STATE 140 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ARONSON & McKERSIE] 
(study of three shutdowns in New York; almost 60% of the terminated workers were 
unemployed over six months after the shutdowns); T. BARocc1, D1s1NVESTMENT IN MAS-
SACHUSETTS (1979), cited in BLUESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 65, 291 (average 
duration of unemployment after shutdown was 60 weeks). 
1
• See, e.g., Hammerman, Five Case Studies of Displaced Workers, 87 MONTHLY LAB. 
REV. 663, 669 (1964) (in each of the five cases, more than half of the reemployed workers 
had lower earnings); ARONSON & McKERSIE, supra note 9, at 142 (more than one-third of 
the workers experienced a drop in income of over 20% in their next job). 
11 See S. Coss & S. KAsL, .TERMINATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF Joa Loss 175-79 (U.S. 
Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare Pub. No. 77-224, 1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Coss & KAsL] (job loss leads to increased likelihood of coronary disease, diabetes, peptic 
ulcer, gout, arthritis, and hypertension; longitudinal study of two plant closings which 
occured in the mid-1960's); Parnes & King, Middle-Aged Job Losers, 4 INDUS. GERON-
TOLOGY 77, 91 (1977) (health deterioration among workers was greater than among con-
trol group; national longitudinal study spanning seven years). 
" See Stillman, The Devastating Impact of Plant Relocations, in PLANT CLOSINGS: 
RESOURCES FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS, TRADE UNIONISTS & COMMUNITY LEADERS 32, 33 (E. 
Kelly & L. Webb eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Kelly & Webb] (eight workers out of 
nearly 2000 workers terminated from a plant closing committed suicide); COBB & KASL, 
supra note 11, at 134-35. (out of 208 terminated employees, two committed suicide, one 
attempted suicide and one seriously threatened suicide; the suicide rate was 30 times 
that normally expected in this population). 
• 11 Coss & KASL, supra note 11, at 145. 
14 See, e.g., Manuso, Coping With Job Abolishment, 19 J. OCCUPATIONAL MEo. 598, 
598 (1977); R. WILCOCK & W. FRANKE, UNWANTED WORKERS: PERMANENT LAYOFFS AND 
LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT 166 (1963) (termination leads to loss of confidence and loss 
of social ties). 
Plant closings may also lead to marital problems, child abuse, and abuse of women. 
See Moberg, Shutdown: Shattered Factories, Shattered Communities, In These Times, 
June 27-July 3, 1979, at 12 [hereinafter cited as Moberg]. (In Youngstown, Ohio, the 
Help Hotline had three times as many calls about battered women, abused children, and 
maritar problems after the steel plants shut down.). 
1
• Kochan, supra note 6, at 11. 
1
• C & R Associates, Indicators for Measuring the Community Costs of Plant Closings 
3-4 (November 1978) (unpublished paper prepared for the Federal Trade Commission) 
[hereinafter cited as C & R Assoc. Indicators] (older age and strong ties to family and 
community constrain mobility). 
17 See ARONSON & McKERSIE, supra note 9, at 140 (experience not marketable in other 
jobs contributed to difficulty in finding jobs); Lipsky, lnterplant Transfer and Termi-
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The community suffers, too. Local businesses lose profits be-
cause they depend on the plant or its workers to buy their goods 
and services. 19 Their lost profits in turn cause more lost jobs.20 
As people leave to find work elsewhere, property values de-
cline. 21 All of these events-workers being laid off, the plant 
closing, the local businesses losing profits, the property values 
declining-cause the community's tax revenues to decline. 211 The 
lost revenues, plus the increased public expenditures for termi-· 
nated workers, lead to increased tax rates or reduced public ser-
vices for all community residents.18 Moreover, the community 
may lose the spirit that holds it together.14 
Revenues decrease at the state level because workers and local 
businesses have lower taxable incomes while the closed business 
nated Workers, 23 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 191, 199 (1970) (75% of those over 45 were 
unemployed more than 16 weeks after a shutdown compared with only 33% of those 
under 45 who were unemployed more than 16 weeks). 
1• See ARONSON & McKERSIE, supra note 9, at 143 (stress from a shutdown is greater 
for higher paid and skilled workers); J. McCARTHY, TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE 115 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as McCARTHY] (workers with higher seniority and higher earn-
ings suffered the greatest financial loss from the closing). 
" See Bartholomew, Joray, & Kochanowski, Corporate Relocation Impact: South 
Bend, 52 INDIANA Bus. REv. 2, 7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bartholomew et. al.] (closing 
of 500 worker plant is estimated to cause a $2.9 million reduction in food expenditures, 
$2.3 million reduction in rental expenditures, $4.5 million reduction in sale of consumer 
durables, and $5.8 million reduction in the purchase and financing of new homes); 
Moberg, supra note 14, at 12 (Policy Management Associates' study of steel shutdowns 
in Youngstown projected a retail sales drop of up to $23 million each year after the steel 
plant shutdown and a total sales loss of between $66 and $102 million). 
•• See, e.g., Bartholomew et. al., supra note 19, at 2 (the closing of a 550 worker plant 
was estimated to cost 3000 jobs); Freedman, 'Plant Closed-No Jobs', ACROSS THE 
BOARD, August 1980, at 12 [hereinafter cited as Freedman] (the closing of Chrysler would 
cause 292,000 lost jobs in addition to the termination of 100,000 Chrysler workers). 
11 See, e.g., C & R Assoc. Indicators, supra note 16, at 5 . 
.. See, e.g., DEP'T OF CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, REVITAL-
IZING DISTRESSED NEIGHBORHOODS A-53 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DEP'T OF CITY AND 
REGIONAL PLANNING] (shutdown of the National Tanning and Trading Co. would have 
resulted in total year's tax loss of $535,000, of which $115,200 would have affected state 
and local treasuries; the plant's managers bought the plant to keep it from shutting 
down); Moberg, supra note 14, at 12 (Policy Management Associates forecast that in the 
first 39 months after a steel plant closing, the communities around Youngstown would 
lose up to $7.8 million in tax revenues). But see Bartholomew et. al., supra note 19, at 8-
9. (The authors estimate that local government in South Bend, Indiana, would need an 
additional $75,000 of revenues to offset the effects of a plant closing. In the third year 
following the closing, however, the plant closing would have the effect of reducing ex-
penditures by $65,000 more than the amount lost in tax revenues.). 
11 C & R Assoc. Indicators, supra note 16, at 14-15 (the increase in public expendi-
tures comes from increased demand on health facilities and for income support services). 
14 See, e.g., Kotz, Youngstown's Tragedies: A Legacy for Other Cities, Wash. Post, 
June 17, 1979, at B5, col. 5 (Mr. Art Young, a Youngstown businessman, said "What we 
lost [when the Youngstown Sheet & Tube plant closed] was community participation 
and pride."). 
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pays no taxes whatsoever.111 Concurrently, the state increases ex-
penditures for unemployment compensation and public assis-
tance. 26 Though the effect on the average state citizen in no way 
compares to the effect on the plant workers and their commu-
nity, some citizens outside the community also suffer from the 
cutback of many worthwhile services. 27 
B. Forms of Relief for Terminated Workers 
Current methods for easing the adjustment to plant closings 
vary, though providing financial assistance to the worker repre-
sents the most common source of relief. All states provide unem-
ployment compensation and public assistance. Most states also 
have job retraining programs. Only one state, Maine, requires 
payment of severance benefits.28 
In addition to state benefits, the federal government compen-
sates workers who lose their jobs because of specific causes such 
as import competition or airline deregulation.29 Federal assis-
tance may include other benefits. A finding of job loss from im-
port · competition, for example, also entitles workers to retrain-
ing, relocation allowances, and job search money.30 Moreover, 
the National Labor Relations Act requires employers to bargain 
over the effects of a closing and, in some instances, over the de-
cision to close.31 Finally, the federal government may help work-
•• See, e.g., Moberg, supra note 14, at 12 (Policy Management Associates' forecast that 
in the first 39 months after the steel plant closing in Youngstown, the state of Ohio 
would lose up to $8 million in tax revenues.). 
•• For example, if a plant closing terminates 500 workers, the average length of unem-
ployment for each worker is six months, see note 9 supra, and the average state unem-
ployment compensation benefits equal $78.60 per week, see note 8 supra, the amount of 
state funds that go to unemployment compensation would increase by more than a mil-
lion dollars. 
•• A good example of this occurrence is the state of Michigan. Because layoffs in the 
auto industry have caused an increase in the amount of state funds that go to paying 
unemployment compensation and public assistance, the state has had to make drastic 
cuts in all state services. As Governor Milliken said, "the cuts slice beyond fat and into 
bone." Detroit News, Nov. 13, 1980, at lA, col. 5 (many drastic cuts made because of 
declining revenues and increased welfare costs); Detroit News, Nov. 14, 1980, at 2B, col. 
1 (workers running out of unemployment compensation are increasing welfare rolls); De-
troit Free Press, Nov. 14, 1980, at lOA, col. 1 (editorial; the cuts will hurt state citizens). 
11 ME. REV. STAT., tit. 26, § 625-8(2). 
•• Compensation is also provided to workers who lose jobs because of railroad or mass 
transit reorganization, or the expansion of Redwood National Park. See generally Mil-
len, Providing Assistance to Displaced Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REv., May, 1979, at 17, 
19-22. 
•
0 Id. at 21. 
., See generally SMITH ET. AL., supra note 4, at 574-75; Levin & Brossman, The Em-
ployer's Duty to Bargain Over a Decision to Close Down, The Nat'l Law J., Nov. 17, 
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ers and communities through business redevelopment loans and 
grants from the Economic Development Administration 
(EDA).32 
The business closing the plant may also aid its workers. Some 
collective bargaining agreements guarantee severance pay, sup-
plemental unemployment benefits (SUB), relocation allowances, 
preferential hiring rights, and/or interplant transfers. 88 Indeed, 
some firms provide the above assistance to workers even though 
their union contract does not require them to do so. 84 
Businesses have voluntarily given advance notice of plant clos-
ings as well. 86 Moreover, approximately ten percent of major col-
lective bargaining agreements stipulate that workers be given 
advance notice of plant closings.88 Only Maine and Wisconsin 
require businesses to give notice of plant closings, though the 
Wisconsin law is not being enforced. 87 Federal law merely re-
1980, at 25, col. 1. 
.. U.S. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF LABOR, A GUIDE FOR 
COMMUNITIES FACING MAJOR LAYOFFS OR PLANT SHUTDOWNS 13, 27 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as ETA GUIDE]. 
11 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2065, CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, JANUARY 1, 1978, at 96, 98 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as BLS]: 
Agreements Workers 
SUB 220 (14.3%) 1,947,400 (27.6%) 
Severance Pay 500 (32.5%) 2,840,700 (40.3%) 
Transfer Rights 456 (29.7%) 3,297,100 (46.7%) 
Preferential 175 (11.4%) 1,905,150 (27.0%) 
Hiring Rights 
Relocation 201 (13.1 %) 1,989,800 (28.2%) 
Allowance 
Total Number of workers = 7,054,550 
Total Number of Agreements = 1536 (covering 1000 or more employees) 
u See, e.g., Wong, Out of Business-A Plant Shutdown Is Always Painful But It 
Need Not Be Merciless, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Wong] 
(The American Oil Co. provided relocation allowances, training, and transfer rights to 
employees before shutting down its Arkansas plant.); Daily Lab. Rep't, Oct. 2, 1980, at 
D-1 [hereinafter cited as Brown & Williamson Tobacco] (Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. provided relocation allowances, severance pay, transfer rights, and a concerted ef-
fort to find employment for all workers affected by its 1980 closing of a Louisville plant.). 
aa E.g., McKersie, Advance Notice, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1980, at 20, col. 3 [hereinafter 
cited as McKersie] (Sperry Rand gave one year advance· notice before closing its Library 
Furniture Division in New York as did GAF Corp. when it terminated its involvement in 
Vermont Asbestos). 
aa BLS, supra note 33, at 100 (The 10% of major collective bargaining agreements 
with advance notice provisions affects 710,800 workers or 10% of the workers covered by 
agreements including 1000 or more employees.). 
17 ME. REv. STAT., tit. 26, § 625-B(6) (Supp. 1980-81) (60 days advance notice re-
quired); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109-.07(1) (West Supp. 1980) (60 days advance notice re-
quied). The Wisconsin law has not been enforced because (a) the legislators did not de-
fine "cessation of business" and (b) the law was intended to guarantee payment of all 
wages but does not-a business can be out of business before it can be determined 
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quires employers to provide enough notice so that the union has 
an opportunity to bargain over rights of employees whose em-
ployment status will be altered. 88 
C. The Inadequacies of the Current Relief System 
Despite these efforts, grave inadequacies remain in the re-
sponse to. plant closings. Only a small minority of workers re-
ceive advance notice of plant closings.89 Federal programs only 
apply to workers in special types of plant closings.4° State unem-
ployment benefits run out before many workers get a new job.•1 
Retraining programs have proved ineffective in many in-
stances. •1 Medical benefits cease when the plant closes even 
though workers need them most when they lose their job.48 Only 
a minority of firms protect workers against the financial and 
psychological effects of plant closings." Community problems 
whether it will meet its last payroll. The law only covers employers with over 100 em-
ployees, while businesses that do not pay all wages usually have less than 100 employees. 
See Letter from James L. Stelsel, Director of Labor Standards Bureau, Wisconsin Dep't 
of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, to Joseph A. Cipparone (Nov. 26, 1980) (on file 
at the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
18 See 2 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 113170.72. The National Labor Relations Board has never 
stipulated the length of notice required. As long as the union has a meaningful opportu-
nity to bargain over the closing or its effects, the employer may provide notice to the 
union any time before the closing. See, e.g., Farm Crest Bakeries Local 51, 241 N.L.R.B. 
No. 195 (1979) (two-day notice sufficient); ABC Trans-national Transport, Inc. Local 
100, 247 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (1980) ·(one-week notice not sufficient; employer firmly made 
his decision to close before giving notice and, hence, the union had no meaningful oppor-
tunity to bargain over the closing; union could have changed decision if it had meaning-
ful opportunity to bargain). 
•• Only 10% of the workers covered by major collective bargaining agreements receive 
advance notice of plant closings. The percentage of workers not covered by major agree-
ments or not unionized that receive advance notice is probably even less because these 
workers have even less bargaining power. There is no reason to believe that most firms 
provide more than a few days advance notice voluntarily. 
•• Only workers in the transportaton industry and the Redwood National Park have 
any assurance of federal aid. The U.S. Dep't of Labor rejects many more applications for 
Trade Readjustment Assistance (aid for jobs lost through import competition) than it 
accepts. See, e.g., Daily Lab. Rep't, May 22, 1980, at A-2. 
41 Most state unemployment compensation programs provide benefits up to an 
amount sufficient to last approximately six months. See 1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGO-
TIATIONS & CoNT. (BNA) § 16 at 831. Since many workers may be unemployed for over 
six months (see note 9 supra), benefits run out before workers find jobs. 
•• See Jarley, supra note 7, at 10-11. 
•• ARONSON & McKERSIE, supra note 9, at 142-43; Kelly & Webb, supra note 12, at 37 
(fewer than 30% of the unemployed have any health insurance; those who do have insur-
ance spend 20-25% of their unemployment benefits to continue their former coverage). 
•• Less than a majority of workers covered by major collective bargaining agreements 
receive plant closing assistance from firms. See note 33 supra. Workers that are not un-
ionized or not covered by a major collective bargaining agreement probably receive even 
• 
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are virtually ignored.411 Finally, and most importantly, termi-
nated workers receive no assurance they will get what they need 
most-a job.46 Consequently, workers and communities have 
called for comprehensive legislation to deal with their plant clos-
ing problems. 
Legislative proposals to date have ranged from providing loans 
to employees and communities for buying plants that are clos-
ing, to requiring businesses to contribute to a community read-
justment fund, to creating a federal agency with powers to pe-
nalize businesses for "unjustified" relocations.47 The most 
popular legislative proposal, however, has been advance notice of 
plant closings. 48 The next two parts of this article examine the 
arguments for and against requiring advance notice of plant 
closings. 
II. ARGUMENTS FOR REQUIRING ADVANCE NOTICE OF PLANT 
CLOSINGS 
Advance notice alleviates the suffering that accompanies plant 
closings by providing time to: (a) explore ways to keep the plant 
open; (b) plan and implement job search strategies to keep 
workers employed; (c) plan for the decrease in tax revenues and 
the increase in public expenditures; (d) plan for disruption of 
the local economy; (e) obtain government aid before the plant 
closes; and (f) cushion the psychological blow from a plant 
closing. 
The plant would remain open in many instances if the em-
ployer could cut operating costs or find a buyer for the plant. 
Advance notice gives workers and community leaders a chance 
to sit down with the company's management and figure out how 
to keep the plant from closing. For example, workers may be 
willing to forego certain benefits until the plant gets on its feet, 
less aid. Though employers must bargain with a union over the effects of a closing, they 
do not have to agree to provide any assistance. 
•• Communities receive no tax relief from the closing of a plant. 
•• In Japan and other industralized countries, workers are guaranteed a job and the 
emotional security that goes with it. See Drucker, Planning for Redundant Workers, 
Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1979, at 28, col. 3. [hereinafter cited as .Drucker]. 
41 See S. 2400, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (provides loans to employees and communi-
ties to buy closing plants); H.R. 13100, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (requires relocation of 
plant be justified); Ohio S.B. 188, 113th Gen. Assembly (1979-80) (creates community 
readjustment fund). 
48 Of the nine federal billa listed in note 2 supra, seven of them have advance notice 
provisions. All of the state billa have advance notice provisions. 
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and community leaders may be able to lower the business' tax 
rate.49 If cutting costs fails to keep the plant open workers and 
community leaders could help seek plant buyers or consider 
buying the plant themselves.50 Without advance notice, such al-
ternatives could not be fully explored. 
While efforts are being made to save the plant, employees can 
look for other work. Moreover, a committee of workers, commu-
nity leaders, state and local employment officials, and the plant 
personnel director could set up job counseling programs,51 talk 
to area employers, explore the ·possibility of Comprehensive Em-
ployment and Training Act (CETA) jobs with CETA prime 
sponsors,52 and retrain workers for the available jobs.58 All of 
this could be accomplished before any worker suffers 
unemployment. 
At the state and local level, advance notice would enable gov-
ernment officials to plan both for lower revenues and the in-
creased expenditures resulting from a plant closing.54 Health fa-
cilities could prepare for the increased demand for medical care 
that occurs when workers lose their jobs.55 Community leaders 
could take action to bring more businesses to town and to obtain 
•• See, e.g., McKersie, supra note 35, at 20 (workers at the U.S. Steel Ambridge Works 
sacrificed certain compensation improvements, in exchange for the company's agreement 
to keep the plant running); DEP'T OF CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING, supra note 22, at A-
53 (to save the National Tanning and Trading Co., the town provided tax abatements 
and the state provided a $500 tax credit for each unemployed worker that was rehired). 
•• E.g., Raskin, One That Was Saved, ACROSS THE BOARD, August 1980, at 19-22. The 
Sperry Rand Corp. sold their Library Furniture Division to the Mohawk Valley Commu-
nity Corp.-a corporation started by the workers to buy the plant-after Sperry an-
nounced the closing one year before the expected closing date. 
"' See, e.g., Meyerson, The Trade Expansion Act: An Untapped Resource for the 
Middle-Aged and Older Worker (pt. 2), INDUS. GERONTOLOGY, Spring 1972, at 36, 41 (755 
displaced Uniroyal Tire employees had counseling interviews with Rhode Island Dep't of 
Employment Security officers; the interviews led to placing 105 persons and retraining 
313 persons.). 
•• See ET A GUIDE, supra note 32, at 10, 28. 
•• A good example of how a committee of city, state, and plant representatives can 
work together to help displaced workers is the Armour Coordinating Team set up in the 
early 1960's to deal with the closing of a meatpacking plant in Omaha, Nebraska. See 
Stern, Evolution of Private Manpower Planning in Armour's Plant Closings, MONTHLY 
LAB. REv., Dec. 1969, at 21. . 
Studies of retraining programs instituted in the U.S. following a plant closing, how-
ever, have concluded that the programs were largely ineffective. Ineffectiveness was 
blamed on insufficient time to design a program targeted to known employment opportu-
nities and to workers' educational level. Thus, advance notice would help retraining ef-
forts by providing that time. See, e.g., Young, The Armour Experience, in An.JUSTING TO 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 157-58 (G. Somers, E. Cushman & N. Weinberg ed. 1963); 
Jarley, supra note 7, at 74 . 
.. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra. 
•• See note 23 supra. 
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assistance for developing current businesses. Advance notice 
would also allow local businesses and their employees to plan for 
the inevitable drop in demand for their goods and services. Busi-
nesses could adjust inventory levels; their employees could look 
for work before being laid off. 
Advance notice would allow government aid to reach workers, 
the community, and the dislocating business earlier. Workers 
could apply for food stamps, public assistance, and unemploy-
ment compensation before the closing so that benefits start flow-
ing as soon as they become unemployed.06 The community could 
seek EDA loans and grants to bolster the local economy before 
the plant closes.1n Further, a business closing a plant due to im-
port competition could obtain the technical or financial assis-
tance in time to save the plant. 118 
Advance notice would cushion the psychological blow of a 
plant closing. 69 Loss of a job resembles the loss of a loved 
one-when it occurs without warning, its impact is more severe 
than when one can mentally prepare for the tragedy and plan 
for the future. 80 Indeed, if employees felt that they had control 
over their own futures because of a sound reemployment pro-
gram and constant information about the options and benefits 
available to them, the mental distress caused by a plant closing 
might be less severe. 
Finally, arguments stressing economic efficiency and equitable 
considerations support advance notice. Imposing the costs of ad-
vance notice on businesses benefits society by making the com-
pany's decision to close reflect the social as well as private costs 
of closing.81 Businesses, moreover, have a greater capacity to 
06 As an example, workers terminated because of import competition would get their 
Trade Readjustment Assistance (TRA) sooner, if advance notice were provided. See Mc-
CARTHY, supra note 18, at 82. 
•• See ET A GUIDE, supra note 32, at 13. 
08 Id. at 17 (Under the Trade Act of 1974, businesses affected by import competition 
can receive loans, grants, and technical assistance). 
•• See C & R Associates; Legislation in Western Europe on Mass Dismissals and Plant 
Closings 65 (February 1979) (unpublished paper prepared for the Federal Trade Com-
mission) [hereinafter cited as C & R Assoc. Studies of W. European Legislation]. 
80 See Ray, The Labor Relations Impact of Store Closings in the Retail Food Indus-
try, 31 LAB. L.J. 482, 482 (1980) (author uses same analogy to describe psychological 
effect of store closings). 
•• For a good discussion of this issue, see Hekman & Strong, Is There A Case For 
Plant Closing Laws?, NEW ENGLAND EcoN. REv., July/August 1980, at 35-37 [hereinafter 
cited as Hekman & Strong]. One might argue that if the social costs of a closing should 
be considered in the business' decision to close, then the social benefits of closings should 
also be considered in that decision. Relocation does provide jobs for workers, increased 
revenues for the community, and increased profits for local businesses in the new loca-
tion. However, relocating businesses usually leave a depressed area (i.e., the Northeast) 
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bear the costs than do the workers,62 and plant closings usually 
cause greater hardship for workers than owners. In most clos-
ings, workers lose their livelihood; owners simply lose their in-
vestment. 83 The plant closing is no more the workers' and the 
community's fault than it is the management's fault-it only 
seems fair that businesses share in the burden the plant closing 
. will bring. 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REQUIRING ADVANCE NOTICE OF 
PLANT CLOSINGS 
A. Harm to the Economy: Inefficient Allocation of Resources 
and Firms Locating Abroad 
Opponents contend that advance notice will hurt the national 
economy by inefficiently allocating resources and encouraging 
firms to leave the country.414 When businesses fail to foresee the 
need to shutdown, the argument goes, advance notice restrains 
capital mobility and results in an inefficient allocation of re-
sources. This argument, though internally consistent, ignores the 
following: first, advance notice creates efficiencies in the labor 
market, the local economy, and the expenditure of tax dollars; 
and second, many businesses can foresee the need to close their 
plants. 
During the notice period, plant workers and workers in af-
fected local businesses can seek new employment, thus avoiding 
inefficient unemployment lines after the plant closes. If a busi-
ness announced that it was relocating, workers from across the 
nation could make plans to move to the new location. The larger 
and more skilled pool of workers that the business would be able 
to pick from should result in greater efficiency at the new plant. 
and move to a growing area (i.e., the South and West). Since jobs are usually scarce in 
depressed areas and plentiful in growing areas, the social costs of the closing will likely 
exceed the social benefits of location in the new area. Of course, where a business is just 
closing the plant and not relocating it, there are no social benefits to a new community. 
•• This rationale for businesses bearing the cost pervades our whole idea of products 
liability. Since a business can bear the cost of an injury to a customer by raising its price, 
they are held strictiy liable for any malfunctioning of their products. Likewise, a business 
can raise its price to pay for advance notice. 
•• This disparity is especially great where the owners are not personally liable for any 
business loss (e.g., corporations) or where the owners will actually gain from the closing 
because the plant is relocating for greater profit. 
64 E.g., McKenzie, Frustrating Business Mobility, REGULATION, May/June 1980, at 32, 
38. 
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Within local businesses, advance notice would allow efficient 
planning of inventory reductions, production output, and labor 
needs. State and local governments could also devise an efficient 
scheme for reducing tax expenditures or obtaining extra funds 
before the fiscal crunch occurs. Hence, the greater efficiencies 
created by advance notice could well offset any inefficiencies· 
created. 
If businesses can anticipate the closing of their plants, ad-
vance notice will certainly allocate resources efficiently. Long-
range planning will prevent any restraint on capital. Many busi-
nesses have the ability to foresee the need to close plants: Amer-
ican companies in this country and abroad have provided ad-
v~ce notice for years. ea In the case of relocations, it takes time 
to find a new plant site and construct the new plant. Moreover, 
enactment of an advance notice law will create an incentive to 
improve the forecasting of plant closings. 88 
Advance notice, nevertheless, may cause some businesses to 
locate in foreign countries. At the margin, any increase in pro-
duction costs in the United States encourages some businesses 
to produce abroad. Since an advance notice law may increase 
production costs in the United States, some businesses might 
decide to locate in other countries. Increased cost from advance 
notice, however, will probably not have a dramatic effect on for-
eign investment. The avoided costs of advance notice do not 
compare with the savings from lower wage rates, less expensive 
resources, and greater access to foreign markets that presently 
lure businesses abroad.87 Moreover, legislators can minimize the 
"" See, e.g., note 35 supra; Weber & Taylor, Procedures For Employee Displacement: 
Advance Notice of Plant Shutdown, 36 J. Bus. 302, 307 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 
Weber & Taylor) (32 surveyed plants in U.S. gave advance notice). 
American companies operating in Sweden have had to give advance notice since 1952, 
in W. Germany since 1951, in Great Britain since 1965, and in Canada since 1971. See B. 
REUBENS, THE HARD-TO-EMPLOY: EUROPEAN PROGRAMS 316-321 (1970) [hereinafter cited 
as REUBENS); J. ELEEN & A. BERNARDINE, SHUTDOWN: THE IMPACT OF PLANT SHUTDOWN, 
EXTENSIVE EMPLOYMENT TERMINATIONS, AND LAYOFFS ON THE WORKERS AND THE COMMU-
NITY 81 (1971) [hereinafter cited as El.BEN & BERNARDINE) . 
.. The Altman Z-score and "the gamblers ruin prediction of bankruptcy" formula al-
ready provide good predictions on business failures up to two years in advance. See gen-
erally Hershman, How to Figure Who's Going Bankrupt, DuN's REVIEW, October 1975, 
at 63. 
An ·advance notice law will create an incentive to refine prediction techniques because 
if a business can foresee a shutdown, there will be no restraint on its capital and the 
costs of providing notice will be lower. See text accompanying notes 67-83 infra. 
•• The cost of advance notice is a "one shot deal" when the plant closes. Wage rates, 
resources, and access to markets, however, are ongoing, bringing continual savings. Since 
wage rates in some countries may be as low as one-third of the U.S. wage rate, this 
savings is enormous. See, e.g., PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 65 (1979) 
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effect of advance notice on foreign investment by shortening the 
notice period and exempting newer businesses from the notice 
requirement. The former will keep the costs of advance notice 
down;68 the latter will erase some of the disincentive for new in-
vestments in the United States.69 
B. Harm to Businesses Resulting From Required Advance 
Notice 
1. Decline in productivity- The most common criticism of 
advance notice is that it causes productivity decline.7° Critics say 
that once a business notifies the workers of the plant closing, 
workers lose morale, have lower pride in their work, and become 
increasingly absent. 71 In addition, "key" employees supposedly 
leave to seek other employment.71 Yet, several factors can pre-
vent productivity from declining after a plant closing announce-
ment: a viable reemployment program, an incentive pay system, 
severance pay and transfer rights conditioned on working at the 
plant until it closes, worker vacations or other compensated time 
off deferred until after the plant closes, temporary employees 
hired to fill in for absent workers. A depressed local labor mar-
(Mexico's minimum wage is $1.06 per hour which is one-third of the U.S. minimum 
wage.). 
118 See notes 112-13 and accompanying text infra. 
80 Since exempting new businesses from the advance notice requirement diminishes 
the adverse consequences of a new venture that goes sour, the cost of advance notice will 
probably be less of a factor in a business' new investment decisions. Cf. Kelly, Plant 
Closing Legislation: The Ohio Experience, in PLANT CLOSINGS: ISSUES, POLITICS, AND 
LEGISLATION 35, 36 (W. Schweke ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Schweke] (no corporation 
will make a major new investment in a state with a concern for how to close its plant 
many years later). 
•• See, e.g., Kramer, Plant Locations (and Relocations) From A Labor Relations Per-
spective, INDUS. DEV., Nov./Dec. 1979, at 2, 4; Casner-Lotto, Plant Closings, Relocations 
Increase: Federal Legislation Proposed to Reduce Disruption to Communities, Employ-
ees, World of Work Rep't, Dec. 1979, at 93 [hereinafter cited as Casner-Lotto]. 
71 See Weber & Taylor, supra note 65, at 312. 
•• See G. SHULTZ & A. WEBER, STRATEGIES FOR THE DISPLACED WORKER 19 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as SHULTZ & WEBER). Only one study has found that worker morale 
decreased, absenteeism increased, and departure of key employees increased after ad-
vance notice was given. The employees in that study, though, had nothing to do during 
the notice period. With nothing to do, it is no wonder that employee morale and produc-
tivity declined. See F. Foltman, The Advance Notice of Closing Policy-CSEA-AFSCME 
New York State April 1976 through March 31, 1977-An Assessment 47-48 (March 7, 
1977) (unpublished paper available from the New York State School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations) [hereinafter cited as Foltman I); F. Foltman, New York State Advance 
Notice of Closing Policy: A Follow-Up Study in Two Affected Locations 20 (January 6, 
1978) (unpublished paper available from New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations) [hereinafter cited as Foltman II) (admission that employees had nothing to do 
during the notice period). 
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ket can also prevent productivity decline. 
A constructive, well-organized reemployment program demon-
strates to employees that the company cares about their welfare. 
This show of concern may boost morale and stabilize productiv-
ity.73 Where an incentive pay system exists, employees seeking 
the largest possible earnings before the shutdown will put in a 
lot of overtime.74 The extra hours worked by these employees 
makes up for the hours missed by absent or departing workers. 
Conditioning severance pay and transfer rights on staying until 
the plant closes should have a marked effect on holding "key" 
employees, because severance pay and transfer rights are based 
on seniority and "key" employees usually have high seniority.76 
Unfortunately, conditioning these benefits on working until the 
actual closing may discourage some workers from seeking reem-
ployment during the notice period. This danger can be mini-
mized, however, if the union and the employer constantly re-
mind workers that their employment and financial well-being 
after the shutdown depend upon their seeking reemployment 
during the notice period. 
Deferring vacations and other compensated time off maxi-
mizes the number of hours employees work during the notice pe-
riod. Hiring temporary employees can help fill the hours that 
absent or departing employees have not worked. Finally, a de-
pressed local labor market will provide workers remaining in the 
area with an incentive to work as many hours as possible until 
the plant closes. 76 
Thus, if all of these conditions exist during the closing, pro-
ductivity should not decline.77 Management, however, must 
devote time and energy to develop and maintain a successful re-
employment program. Employers have to pay more money for 
73 See SHULTZ & WEBER, supra note 72, at 18-19. 
•• Id. at 19. 
'" See Weber & Taylor, supra note 65, at 313. 
•• Id. 
77 Id. at 312-13 (no productivity decline found in 32 plant closings studied; employers 
usually provided severance pay and transfer rights conditioned on working at plant until 
closing); B. Portis & M. Suys, Effect of Advance Notice in a Plant Shutdown 8, 27 (1970) 
(available in the Industrial Relations Library, University of Michigan Graduate School of 
Business) [hereinafter cited as Portis & Suys] (the Kelvinator plant was owned by an 
American company; over 500 employees given five and one-half months advance notice 
of shutdown; plant managers say morale remained good and productivity did not decline 
during notice period; severance pay conditioned on staying until closing). 
All of the conditions stated in the text may not have to exist to prevent productivity 
decline. Yet, no study delineates which of those conditions must exist and which of those 
conditions do not have to exist to prevent that decline. More empirical research is 
needed here. 
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overtime work than regular work. Providing severance pay adds 
even more to these expenses.78 Hence, these costs must be bal-
anced against the benefits of advance notice. 79 
2. Cancellation of orders for the employer's goods- Can-
cellation of orders may also constitute a cost of requiring ad-
vance notice.8° Customers concerned about the availability of 
spare parts may only buy from a supplier that is not closing 
down.81 A company that relocates and continues producing the 
same product, however, can always fill orders from the new loca-
tion. A company also may engender ill will among its customers 
by cutting off their supply without advance warning,82 thereby 
precluding future sales to those customers. Hence, companies 
concerned about future sales may want to provide advance no-
tice anyway. Further, if the company discontinues a product line 
but alternative suppliers are not readily available, customers will 
probably not cancel their orders during a short notice period.83 
A problem with cancellation of orders occurs, though, when a 
company discontinues a product line and alternative suppliers 
are readily available. If spare parts for the closing company's 
product are not produced by other companies, customers may 
cancel their orders and buy from another company they know 
will not be discontinuing its product line. Thus, in the limited 
situation where the production of a particular product is ceasing, 
alternative suppliers are readily available, other companies do 
not make spare parts for the ceasing product line, and future 
sales to present customers do not concern the business closing 
the plant, cancellation of orders may constitute a cost of ad-
vance notice. 
3. Intrusion upon management's right to close shop- Ad-
vance notice will also intrude upon management's prerogative to 
78 For those firms that already provide severance benefits because of their union con-
tract, providing severance benefits will not be an extra expense of requiring advance 
notice. For the percentage of major collective bargaining agreements requiring payment 
of severance benefits, see note 33 supra. 
70 Unfortunately, there is no way to test whether the cost of avoiding productivity 
decline is less than the cost of productivity decline and, if they are less, by how much. It 
is assumed here that the cost of avoiding productivity decline is less than the cost of 
productivity decline. Thus, employers would take measures to avoid productivity decline. 
•• See McKersie, supra note 35, at 20; Casner-Lotto, supra note 70, at 93. 
11 No study has ever shown a cancellation of order to occur, but no study has ever 
investigated this possibility either . 
.. See Weber & Taylor, supra note 65, at 308. 
•• A notice period of less than a year should not result in a significant number of 
cancellations where alternative suppliers are not readily available since it will take time 
for alternative suppliers to move into the area or for the customer to find an alternative 
supplier. 
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close shop whenever it pleases.84 Requiring advance notice, how-
ever, will not deny management the freedom to close the plant, 
the freedom to locate a plant wherever it pleases, or the freedom 
to maximize profits-it only imposes a reasonable restraint on 
the exercise of these freedoms. Even if management can be said 
to have the prerogative to close shop whenever it pleases, this 
constitutes only a minor cost of advance notice. 
4. Inability to obtain credit- Critics often cite the closing 
business' inability to obtain credit as another cost of advance 
notice. 811 Yet most banks will be reluctant to offer credit to a 
business losing money regardless of a plant closing announce-
ment. 88 A sound business can obtain the money needed to relo-
cate from a bank in either the present location or the new loca-
tion. 87 In terms of supplier credit, though, a business may 
encounter resistance in delaying payment once it makes the 
plant closing announcement. Suppliers, unlike banks, do not 
have employees checking whether a business has sufficient assets 
to repay its debts. An agreement giving the supplier a security 
•• See McKenzie, The Right To Close Shop, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1980, at A19, col. 1. 
One author has even argued that requiring advance notice results in a "taking" without 
just compensation. See Arnold, Existing and Proposed Regulation of Business Disloca-
tions, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 209, 247-51 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Arnold]. Professor 
Arnold essentially relies on Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of La., 251 U.S. 396 
(1920) and People e:r.. rel. Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co., 98 Misc. 2d 856, 414 N.Y.S.2d 823 
(1978). Brooks-Scanlon involved a railroad company that wanted to abandon its opera-
tions, but was ordered to continue providing service. The Court held that requiring the 
railroad company to continue operating would constitute a compensable taking. The 
courts, however, have recently ruled that a railroad company may suffer temporary losses 
without violating the Fifth Amendment taking clause. See New Haven Inclusion Cases, 
99 U.S. 392, 491-92 (railroad required to continue operating for six years; no compensa-
ble taking); Lehigh & New England Ry. Co. v. I.C.C., 540 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1976)("a rail-
road ... may be made to suffer interim reasonable losses, without compensation, for a 
reasonable period of time during which solutions accommodating the public and the pri-
vate interests can be devised"). People e:r.. rel. Lewis, supra, involved an insurance com-
pany that wanted to leave the state because it was losing money. The court denied an 
injunction sought by the New York Superintendent of Insurance on the grounds that it 
would violate the Fifth Amendment taking and due process clauses. Yet, this case does 
not involve a state interest that compares with the state interest in easing the effects of 
plant closings. The customers in People e:r.. rel. Lewis would not have lost their insur-
ance claims; the insurance company said it would honor all existing policies. 
If the business can foresee the closing before the notice period begins, moreover, no 
restraint on its property use will occur. Finally, the government may utilize reasonable 
police powers to regulate property use. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 596-603 
(9th ed. 1975). Given the state's legitimate interest in protecting the health and well-
being of its citizens via advance notice, see notes 8-27 and accompanying text supra, the 
requirement of advance notice would represent a reasonable use of its police powers. 
06 See Casner-Lotto, supra note 70, at 93. 
08 Interview with William Spokes, loan officer at Ann Arbor Bank & Trust Co., Ann 
Arbor, Michigan (Dec. 11, 1980). 
•• Id. 
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interest in some assets of the plant, however, could assure the 
supplier of the business' intention to repay the debt. Where a 
sound business simply relocates its plant, advance notice should 
not even affect supplier credit because the supplier knows that 
the business has assets to repay its debt. Thus, advance notice 
should not lead to an inability to obtain credit. 
5. Drop in a corporation's stock price- A drop in a corpora-
tion's stock price is another supposed cost of advance notice.88 
Those who level this criticism, however, would have a hard time 
proving it. Many factors influence stock prices;89 to say that any 
one factor affects stock price seems suspect. Moreover, even if a 
closing announcement represented an important factor in inves-
tors' decisions, advance notice would still benefit investors and 
financial markets.90 A possible drop in a corporation's stock 
price should consequently not be considered a cost of advance 
notice. 
6. Increased opportunity for worker-management disputes-
Many employers worry that advance notice will increase worker-
management disputes.91 Advance notice, however, actually rep-
resents an opportunity to prevent these labor-management con-
flicts.92 Major conflicts will probably not occur if employers 
make a concerted effort to listen to workers, explore alternatives 
for keeping the plant open, and cooperate in efforts to create a 
sound adjustment program.98 The payoff in conflict-free closings 
88 See ARONSON & McKERsm, supra note 9, at 17. No study has ever shown a plant 
closing announcement to affect stock price, but no study has ever investigated it either. 
•• The state of the economy, the health of the plant's industry, the political climate, 
the financial history of the corporation and the rate of dividends paid by the company all 
affect a stock price. 
'"' The more information investors have, the more rational their decision will be on 
stock ownership. The more rational their decisions on what stock to purchase, the more 
that efficient businesses will be rewarded with new investors and the less that inefficient, 
unproductive businesses will be rewarded. Further, the more information investors have, 
the lower their risk in investing and greater their chance of gaining from their 
investment. 
91 See SHULTZ & WEBER, supra note 73, at 18. 
" See McNeff, McNeff, O'Connell & O'Connell, Alternatives to Employee Layoffs: 
Work Sharing and Prelayoff Consultation, 55 PERSONNEL 60, 63 (1978) (pre-layoff con-
sultation can play an important role in labor-management conflict resolution). 
•• Where management has not cooperated with the workers some pilferage and de-
struction of property has occurred. See Portis & Suys, supra note 78, at 8, 28 (manage-
ment did not become involved in programs to assist its production workers); Foltman I, 
supra note 72, at 46-47, 50 (management made unilateral decision to rescind vacation 
time owed to workers; union not consulted about decision to close). However, where 
management has cooperated with the workers the closing was orderly and without inci-
dent. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco, supra note 34. The company provided 18 
months advance notice and a plethora of worker benefits. One of its Vice-Presidents 
testified: "What could have resulted in sabotage, wildcat strikes or slowdowns became an 
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will be well worth the time spent in helping workers adjust to 
the plant closing. 
7. Increased union wage and benefit demands- A related ar-
gument is that advance notice may increase union wage and 
benefit demands.94 Unions might increase their demands be-
cause the employer's inability to close or relocate during the no-
tice period lowers the risk of job loss. This possibility, however, 
does not square with reality. When a business announces a plant 
closing, unions usually try to convince the business to keep the 
plant open.911 Therefore, the union will want to decrease rather 
than increase its demands, in order to lower operation costs.96 
8. Inability to sell the plant- Management may worry that 
advance notice will make it impossible to sell the plant. A buyer 
may balk at buying a plant that must stay open for the notice 
period, because the buyer may want to take over the plant im-
mediately. Any buyer who plans to keep the plant running, how-
ever, has no reason to worry about having to wait-if the plant 
stays open the seller does not have to give JJ.Otice to its workers. 
Moreover, there is no reason to think that buyers not wanting to 
keep the plant open only arrive when the notice period begins. 
Some buyers want to buy today; others want to buy tomorrow. 
Hence, advance notice should not lead to an inability to sell the 
plant. 
9. A conflict with SEC regulations- Finally, an advance no-
tice law might conflict with Securities and Exchange (SEC) reg-
ulations. 97 SEC Rule l0b-5 requires a business to make complete 
and accurate disclosure of pertinent information (i.e., that its 
plant is closing). If a business fails to close its plant after giving 
advance notice, however, investors who detrimentally relied on 
the plant closing announcement might sue under Rule l0b-5 for 
misleading disclosure. The business can avoid this malady, 
though, by couching the plant closing announcement in condi-
tional terms. For instance, the business could say that it will 
close its plant unless unforeseen circumstances change its mind. 
orderly procedure with ... employees continuing to work regularly and diligently." Id. 
at D-1. 
.. See R. McKENZIE, RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS MOBILITY 57 (1979) (available from 
the American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C.). 
•• A good example of unions trying to keep the business open is the recent vote by 
Chrysler employees to make large wage and benefit concessions. See Detroit News, Feb. 
3, 1981, at 5C, col. 2. 
08 See, e.g., notes 49 & 95 supra . 
•• See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHAT'S NEW IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTI-
ATIONS AND CONTRACTS, no. 906, pt. 1, at 4 (1980) (raising issue but offering no explana-
tion of why SEC regulations may present a problem for advance notice). 
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Thus, no conflict with SEC regulations should occur. 
To summarize, requiring advance notice provides time to 
search for jobs, explore ways to keep the plant open, adjust pub-
lic expenditures, obtain government aid, reduce mental distress, 
and plan for the disruption of the local economy. Like any re-
form proposal, though, requiring advance notice would also en-
tail some costs, including: (a) encouraging some businesses to 
produce abroad, (b) avoiding a decline in productivity, (c) possi-
ble cancellation of orders under certain circumstances, and (d) 
intruding on management's prerogative to close whenever it 
pleases. These costs are a small price to pay for keeping people 
employed and running local government and local business effi-
ciently. On balance, legislators should enact an advance notice 
statute. 
IV. A MODEL ADVANCE NOTICE STATUTE 
Advance notice legislation must satisfy three goals. First, the 
legislation must establish minimum requirements for a viable 
advance notice system. This will allow for the variation between 
industries and between firms in the time needed to close a 
plant.98 This feature, moreover, will keep the cost of advance no-
tice down, and encourage creativity between workers and man-
agement in designing adjustment programs requiring more ad-
vance notice than minimally necessary. Second, the legislation 
must take account of different levels of hardship caused by a 
plant closing. Such recognition assures fairness h~tween groups 
affected differently by plant closings. Third, legislation must not 
require advance notice when it would be extremely burdensome 
to the employer. This feature makes the legislation more fair, 
fosters its passage, and aids in its eventual implementation. 
The following model statute, which attempts to meet these 
goals, will be discussed in terms of each substantive section and 
its accompanying definitions. The entire statute appears in the 
Appendix. 
•• Some critics object to a fixed notice period because the time required to relocate or 
shut down a facility will vary widely from case to case. See SHULTZ & WEBER, supra note 
72, at 18. Consequently, an advance notice law would place a lesser burden on those 
industries in which plants normally take a long time to close or relocate than on indus-
tries in which plants normally take a short period of time to close or relocate. Though 
this inequity does exist, keeping the notice period relatively short will minimize it. 
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A. The Notice Requirement 
Section 1: Definitions 
As used in this Act: 
(1) "Business" means any commercial or industrial 
enterprise having an establishment 
within a community for more than 
five years. 
(2) "Close" or "Closing" means a permanent re-
duction of not less than 90 % of the 
highest number of employees working 
at an establishment during the last 
twelve months. 
(3) "Community" means the lowest level of general 
local government jurisdiction in which 
the establishment is located. 
( 4) "Employee" means anyone employed within an 
establishment for at least thirty hours 
per week. 
(5) "Establishment" means all factories, plants, 
business offices, or other working 
places at one location or several loca-
tions within a single community. 
* * * 
(9) "Termination" means the discharge of an em~ 
ployee due to the closing of an 
establishment. 
Section 2: Notice Requirement 
(a) Except as provided in (b), a business that intends 
to close an establishment at which have been employed 
at least 100 but not more than 499 employees at some 
time during the last twelve months, shall provide the no-
tices prescribed by subsections (c) and (d) at least ninety 
days before the termination of any employee. 
(b) A business that intends to close an establishment at 
which have been employed: 
(1) at least 500 employees at some time during the 
last twelve months; or 
(2) at least 100 employees at some time during the 
last twelve months and that number of employees is 
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larger than the number of employees working in any 
other commercial or industrial establishment within 
the community on the date that the business had its 
largest number of employees in the last twelve 
months, 
shall provide the notices prescribed by subsections (c) 
and (d) at least 180 days before the termination of any 
employee. 
(c) Written notice shall be given to: (1) each employee, 
(2) the chief executive officer or elected body governing 
the community, and (3) the State [Department of Labor]. 
Notice may be given by first class mail or personally 
delivered. 
(d) The notice to an employee shall contain the ex-
pected date of the employee's termination, the benefits 
and services provided to employees by the business, and 
a description of the plans for closing the establishment. 
The notice to the chief executive officer or elected body 
governing the community and the notice to the State 
[Department of Labor] shall contain the name of the 
business, the location of the establishment, the expected 
termination date of the employees, the reasons for the 
closing, the number of employees that will be terminated 
because of the closing, a general description of the soon-
to-be terminated employees' skills, and a description of 
the plans for closing the establishment. 
Subsection (a) and (b) of the notice requirement contain the 
essence of all advance notice legislation: who must give notice 
when. Consequently, many aspects of these subsections deserve 
special attention. 
1. Explanations of key terms- The definition of the word 
"business" includes the phrase "for more than five years" be-
cause a plant closing has a greater psychological and financial 
effect on workers and communities when expectations exist that 
the plant will continue running. Workers, for example, buy 
homes instead of apartments, local businesses develop new prod-
uct lines, and governments start new programs. Moreover, re-
stricting the application of this law to older businesses means 
the legislation will not discourage the creation of new businesses. 
This consideration is important because the best way for a com-
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munity to replace lost jobs is by attracting new ones.99 
The word "close" raises two other important considerations. 
Requiring businesses to give notice only when they shut down 
completely excludes situations where a significant number of 
workers lose their jobs for other reasons, such as only one part of 
a plant closing down or management bringing in new labor-sav-
ing machinery. Legislators, nevertheless, should seriously study 
and consider requiring notice in situations of partial closing and 
technological change100-problems outside the scope of this arti-
cle. European advance notice legislation covers partial closings 
and technological change by requiring notice when the employer 
terminates a specific number of workers instead of when the 
plant shuts down. 101 If desired, legislators can easily change the 
proposed statute to take account of partial closings and techno-
logical change. 102 
"" Unfortunately, neither of the major federal bills on plant closings contained this 
exemption of new businesses. See National Employment Priorities Act of 1981, H.R. 565, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter cited as H.R. 565]; Employee Protection and Commu-
nity Stabilization Act of 1979, S. 1609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter cited as S. 
1609]. 
The choice of five years is admittedly arbitrary and based solely on the assumption 
that a five year exemption would be sufficient to keep from discouraging new investment. 
100 Some questions that need study are: Will requiring notice before partial closing or 
technological change within the plant cause constant disruption of the production pro-
cess? Do partial closings and technological change within the plant cause less hardship 
than permanent closings and, if so, is there still a case for requiring advance notice in 
these situations? Will requiring notice before technological change within the plant pro-
duce a disincentive to modernize production processes? What effect does giving advance 
notice to some workers have on those workers that are not involved in the termina-
tions-does their productivity decline? 
101 For example, Sweden requires advance notice of six months when 100 workers are 
terminated whether or not the entire plant is closing. See note 107 infra. H.R. 565, in the 
current Congress and S. 1609 in the last Congress, see note 99 supra, do not key notice 
on the number of layoffs but instead on the termination or transfer of the business oper-
ation. Thus, they do not cover partial closings or technological changes within the plant. 
101 If legislators desire advance notice for partial closings and technological change 
within the plant as well as for permanent closings, all they would have to do is adopt the 
following notice requirement: 
Section 2: Notice Requirement 
(a) Except as provided in (b), a business that intends to terminate at least 100 
but not more than 499 employees at some time during the next 12 months shall 
provide the notices prescribed by subsections (c) and (d) at least 90 days before 
the termination of any employee. 
(b) A business that intends to terminate: 
(1) at least 500 employees at some time during the next 12 months; or 
(2) at least 100 employees at some time during the next 12 months and 
the number of employees working at the establishment is larger than the 
number of employees working at any other commercial or industrial es-
tablishment within the community on the date that the business had its 
largest number of employees in the last 12 months, 
shall provide the notice prescribed by subsections (c) and (d) at least 180 days 
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Defining "close" or "closing" in terms of a percentage reduc-
tion in the plant workforce envisions management retaining a 
skeleton crew to disassemble equipment and clean up the plant. 
A business could easily avoid a notice requirement that did not 
take into account the skeleton crew situation. 
The proposed law, which defines "employees" as anyone work-
ing more than thirty hours per week, excludes franchise opera-
tions that hire teenagers part-time. Teenagers working part-time 
do not require the protection of advance notice because they are 
not major breadwinners in most families. Further, the notice re-
quirement, by including the phrase "at some time during the 
last twelve months," prevents employers from evading the stat-
ute by decreasing their workforce to less than one hundred 
workers just before the notice period begins. 
The word "establishment" raises another issue. The phrase 
"at one location or at several locations within a single commu-
nity" in the definition of establishment means a business em-
ploying a total of one hundred workers in two separate plants 
will not escape the notice requirement if it decides to close both 
plants. This provision seems fair because the termination of one 
hundred employees will have the same effect on the workers and 
the community whether the employees were working at one 
plant or several plants.108 
2. Justifications for the notice requirement in subsections ( a) 
and (b)- As the number of terminated workers increases, more 
workers look for employment in the local labor market, more 
workers need retraining, and more tax and sales revenues de-
cline. Thus, the notice period accounts for these escalating de-
mands by increasing between zero and one hundred workers 
(from zero to ninety days) and increasing again between one 
before the termination of any employee. 
{c) [same as· subsection {c) of the notice requirement in the above text] 
{d) The notice to an employee shall contain the expected date of the em-
ployee's termination, the reason for the termination, the benefits and services 
provided to employees by the business, and a description of the plans for termi-
nating the employees. The notice to the chief executive officer or elected body 
governing the community and the notice to the State Department of Labor shall 
contain the name of the business, the location of the establishment, the expected 
termination date of the employees, the reasons for the terminations, the number 
of employees that will be terminated, a general description of. the soon-to-be 
terminated employees' skills, and a description of the plans for terminating the 
employees. 
••• This provision will also have the added advantage of including smaller plants in the 
advance notice requirement. Since smaller plants close more often than larger plants, 
more workers will be protected by advance notice. 
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hundred and 500 workers (from ninety days to 180 days). 104 . 
Besides the number of workers affected by the closing, the 
percentage of the local workforce affected by the closing par-
tially determines the amount of hardship caused by the closing. 
Increases in the percentage of the local workforce terminated by 
the closing exacerbates the inability to find a job, the tax deficit, 
and the sales loss. Consequently, the law should require earlier 
notice when a large percentage of the local workforce is affected. 
Unfortunately, one cannot easily measure the local workforce.1011 
The model statute, therefore, assumes that when the largest em-
ployer in town closes its plant a relatively large percentage of 
the local workforce becomes unemployed. Accordingly, subsec-
tion (b)(2) increases the notice period to 180 days when an em-
ployer with over one hundred workers is the largest employer in 
the community.106 
The most controversial issue in any advance notice legislation 
concerns the length of the notice period. Employees want a 
longer notice period; employers want a shorter notice period. 
These desires reflect that the longer the notice period, the 
higher the costs to the employer and the greater the benefits to 
the terminated employees. Ideally, the notice period should be 
short enough so that employers do not have to bear excessive 
costs but long enough so that workers can find a job. Legislators 
cannot determine an ideal notice period, however, because the 
optimal length of the notice period varies with each closing. 
Under these circumstances, legislators should enact a minimum 
notice period that keeps employers' costs down and gives work-
ers a fighting chance of finding a job after the plant closing. 
The suggested three and six month notice periods should pro-
104 Admittedly, there is no magic in using 100 workers and 500 workers as the points 
for increasing the notice period. These points merely reflect the assumptions that at 100 
workers the community will be affected by the closing as well as the plant workers and 
that at 500 workers the loss to employees and the community are sufficiently greater 
than at 100 workers to increase the notice period. Though most plant closings occur in 
plants with less than 100 workers, see note 1 supra, the effect of closing one plant with 
less than 100 workers is not large enough to justify requiring advance notice. However, 
the definition of establishment should make the notice requirement apply to at least 
some of the plants with less than 100 workers. See note 103 supra. 
••• Local, state and federal governments do not keep unemployment statistics for a 
single community nor is there a record of the number of people employed within each 
community. 
106 One might legitimately ask why more notice than 180 days is not required when 
over 500 employees are terminated and the plant is the largest employer in town. The 
reason is twofold: first, termination of over 500 workers will have a disastrous effect on 
the local labor force whether or not the closing business is the largest employer, and 
second, the legislated notice period should be kept to a minimum. 
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vide that minimum standard of employability and feasibility. 
Those respective time periods were chosen because: first, other 
countries have had favorable experiences with notice periods be-
tween three and six months long107 and second, those who have 
studied plant closings in the United States suggest notice peri-
ods between three and six months long.108 
107 In Canada, employers must give four months notice if over 300 employees will be 
dismissed, three months notice if 100-300 employees will be dismissed, and two months 
notice if 50-100 will be dismissed. See ELEEN & BERNARDINE, supra note 66, at 85. Portis 
& Suys' study on the effect of advance notice on the closing of a London, Ontario, plant 
showed that as many as 42% of the terminated workers may have found new jobs by the 
time the plant closed. Management remarked that production and morale remained good 
during the notice period. See Portis & Suys, supra note 77, at 18, 27. 
Swedish employers planning reductions in force must give to the labor market board: 
- two months prior notice if 5-25 employees will be terminated, 
- four months prior notice if 26-100 employees will be terminated, and 
- six months prior notice if over 100 employees will be terminated .. 
Less notice is permitted if the employer could not foresee the needed reductions in time 
to meet statutory minimums, although such non-compliance must be justified. See C & 
R Associates, Plant Closing Legislation and Regulation in the United States and West-
ern Europe: A Survey 42-43 (January 1979) (unpublished paper prepared for the Federal 
Trade Commission). 
During the notice period, the county labor market board seeks alternatives to closing 
the plant, conducts retraining programs, promotes relocation of workers, seeks new busi-
nesses for the community, and provides extensive job search assistance. See C & R As-
soc., Studies of W. European Legislation, supra note 59, at 26-27; Hekman & Strong, 
supra note 61, at 34, 47-51. 
West Germany, like all European Economic Community members, adheres to the 
Council of European Communities Directive of Feb. 14, 1977, on the Approximation of 
Laws of the Member States Relating to the Safeguarding of Employees Rights in the 
Event of Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses, or Parts of Businesses. Article 6 of that 
directive states, "The transferor must give such information (reasons for the transfer, the 
legal, social, and economic implications of the transfer, and measures envisaged in rela-
tion to the employees) to the representatives of his employees in good time before the 
transfer is carried out." (1978] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ,i 3923F Cne author has said 
that West Germans interpret "in good time" to mean about three months. See McKersie, 
supra note 35, at 20. German employers have reasonably complied with the requirement 
and have expressed their satisfaction with it. See LABOR UNION STUDY TouR PARTICI-
PANTS, ECONOMIC DISLOCATION: PLANT CLOSINGS, PLANT RELOCATIONS AND PLANT CON-
VERSIONS 24, 26 (1979). 
10
• In the United States, the Armour Automation Fund Committee proposed a 90-day 
notice period during the closing of meatpacking plants in the early 1960's. See SHULTZ & 
WEBER, supra note 73, at 19, 190 (The Committee made this recommendation to employ-
ers during the closing of the meatpacking plants; 90-day notice helped make closings in 
Fort Worth, Sioux City, and Kansas City successful.). The American Oil Company, 
which successfully used advance notice before relocating one of its plants in the early 
1970's, suggested a three or four month notice period. See COBB & KASL, supra note 11, 
at 181. See generally Wong, supra note 34, at l; American Oil Co., Closing A Big Indus-
try In A Small Town (1972) (paper presented to the Public Relations Society of America 
as a Silver Anvil Entry for the 28th Annual Competition). 
McKersie has also recommended three months advance notice. See Daily Lab. Rep't, 
Sept. 18, 1980, at E-6 (Prof. McKersie's statement in the hearing before the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor & Human Resources, Sept. 18, 1980). He supports his recommendation 
by pointing to the Continuity of Employment Committee which reviewed the operation 
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Most state and federal legislation pending in 1980 required 
businesses to give notice one or two years in advance.109 These 
notice periods are too long. First, Sweden has the longest ad-
vance notice period in the world (six months) during which they 
carry out an aggressive reemployment program. 110 American law 
need not require a longer notice period to do the same. Second, 
fewer businesses can foresee a closing two years in advance than 
six months in advance. A two year advance notice period, there-
fore, would increase the restraint on capital and thereby de-
crease the chance that advance notice will cause net efficien-
cies. 111 Third, a one or two year notice period will increase the 
cost of avoiding productivity decline,111 the number of cancelled 
orders for the employer's goods,118 and the likelihood that busi-
nesses will move abroad.m Finally, a long notice period exacer-
of advance notice in New York state government and recommended a three month notice 
period. Letter from Robert McKersie to Joseph A. Cipparone (Dec. 22, 1980) (on file at 
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The Committee rejected a six-
month notice period after receiving Prof. Foltman's study of the New York State govern-
ment. The study showed that unproductive behavior occurred during a closing with six 
months advance notice. But see note 72 supra. Shultz and Weber argue for at least six 
months notice. SHULTZ & WEBER, supra note 72, at 191. Less than six months, they ar-
gue, may result in a "crash" program causing many workers, especially those with low 
education levels, to.miss available options. Id. Foltman agrees with Shultz and Weber, 
and also recommends at least six months advance notice. Foltman II, supra note 72, at 
21. He cites the Weber and Taylor study which showed that in 17 of the 32 plant closings 
studied, employers successfully used advance notice of seven months or more. Id. Hence, 
though the three and six month notice requirements are admittedly arbitrary, they do 
have some grounding in empirical study. 
109 For example, H.R. 565, supra note 99, requires two years advance notice if over 500 
employees are terminated. S. 1609, supra note 99, requires one year advance notice if 
over 100 employees are terminated. As of September 3, 1980, Michigan H.B. 5104 re-
quired a maximum of two years advance notice and California S.B. 1494 required one 
year advance notice. 
11
• See note 107 supra. 
111 A two-year advance notice period will create more efficiencies and inefficiencies 
than a six-month notice period. However, no inefficiencies will occur for more businesses 
under a six-month notice period than a two-year notice period because more businesses 
will be able to foresee the closing before the notice period begins. Since efficiencies will 
still occur under the six-month notice period, there is a greater likelihood of net efficien-
cies under a six-month notice period than under a two-year notice period. 
111 As the notice period is increased in length, more overtime wages will have to be 
paid to entice remaining workers to make up for absent or departing workers' missed 
hours.' Moreover, the longer notice period means management will have to spend more 
time and energy maintaining a good reemployment program. · 
m A long notice period will increase cancellation of orders where the product line is 
being discontinued and alternative suppliers are not readily available as well as where 
the product line is being discontinued and alternative suppliers are readily available. See 
note 83 and accompanying text supra. 
11
• At the margin, more businesses will move abroad due to a longer notice period 
because a longer notice period increases the cost of advance notice. See text accompany-
ing notes 67-69 supra. 
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bates the inequity in the costs of advance notice between firms 
and increases the likelihood of constitutional battles.115 If work-
ers want a notice period as long as one or two years, they should 
go to the bargaining table to get it. 118 
The combination of the final phrase "before the termination 
of any employee" with the definition of termination-"a dis-
charge due to the closing of the establishment" -ensures that 
every employee will get the full benefit of the notice period. A 
notice period based on the expected closing date, rather than the 
first day the employer terminates employees, would enable em-
ployers to terminate employees with impunity immediately 
before the notice period begins. 117 
3. Manner of giving notice- Subsections (c) and (d) of the 
notice requirement explain who should receive the notice, how 
they should receive it, and what it should contain. The general 
feeling is "the more the merrier."118 Complete and continuous 
information about the closing will help workers psychologically 
adjust to the closing and will encourage constructive planning by 
the workers, the community, and the state at the earliest possi-
ble date. 
B. Exclusions to the Notice Requirement 
Section 1: Definitions (cont.) 
110 The likelihood of constitutional battles will increase because a greater restraint on 
capital occurs and the cost of closing is higher at two years as opposed to six months. 
This increased burden on employers gives them a greater incentive to sue and would 
make their case more sympathetic in court. See note 84 supra & note 127 infra. 
ue The virtue of using the collective bargaining process is that the employer can trade 
job security for greater productivity from workers. This tradeoff causes more efficiency in 
the plant than if job security is just legislated. Thus, we ought to encourage collective 
bargaining wherever possible. As long as workers receive enough notice to at least ensure 
a chance of finding a job, an advance notice law should not preempt any ground that 
collective bargaining can cover. See Kochan, supra note 6, at 10. For an example of 
collective bargaining leading to a two year advance notice requirement, see BLUESTONE & 
HARRISON, supra note 3, at 250. 
117 To see how this works, assume that the law requires an employer to give three 
months notice before closing. H the employer terminates 80% of his/her workers four 
months before the closing, he/she would not have to give notice to those 80% because 
the employer only has to give notice three months before the closing. Now, if the law 
said the employer must give three months notice before any terminations due to the 
closing, then the employer would have to give notice to those 80% three months before 
any one of them were terminated. Unfortunately, S. 1609, supra note 99, keys the notice 
period on the "termination or transfer of the operation" not on the termination of the 
worker. 
11
• See Weber & Taylor, supra note 65, at 310-11 (give complete information on the 
closing and tell all concerned parties). 
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As used in this Act: 
* * * 
(6). "Intermittent Employment" means employ-
ment that is not customarily carriec;l on continuously 
throughout the year. 
(7) "Involuntary Closing" means (1) any closing 
pursuant to a court order or (2) any closing caused 
by fire, flood or natural disaster, a national emer-
gency, acts of war, civil disorder, industrial sabotage, 
termination of lease, or proceedings in bankruptcy. 
(8) "Short-term Layoff'' means the cessation of 
employment for reasons other than the closing of 
the establishment. 
• • * 
Section 3: Exclusions 
(a) This Act does not apply to: 
(1) an involuntary closing of an establishment; 
(2) intermittent employment, short-term layoffs, or 
the discharge of employees due to strikes or lock-
outs; and 
(3) a business that moves its operations to another 
establishment within fifteen miles of the original es-
tablishment and provides terminated employees 
work at the other establishment within thirty days 
after the closing. 
(b) This Act does not affect the right of employees to 
longer notice as specified in a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
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This statute section delineates those situations where requir-
ing advance notice would be infeasible or unwise. The definition 
of "involuntary closing" summarizes those situations in which 
businesses could not feasibly give advance notice. If a court 
closes a plant for health or safety reasons or because a mortga-
gee wants to foreclose on the business' plant, a business will be 
unable to stay open for the notice period. Likewise, if fire, flood, 
natural disaster, national emergency, acts of war, industrial sab-
otage, or civil disorder make it impossible to continue produc-
tion, a business should not have to give notice.118 If a lessor de-
"' "National emergency" is included in the definition of involuntary closings because 
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cides to terminate a business' long-term lease tomorrow, that 
business could also not give notice to the workers. Finally, a bus-
iness in bankruptcy would not have the money to stay open dur-
ing the notice period. Excluding businesses in these situations 
prevents the advance notice statute from placing an extreme 
burden on business. Ho 
Advance notice is also unnecessary in some instances. Inter-
mittently employed workers do not need notice because they can 
plan for being laid off. Moreover, short-term layoffs usually 
cause less hardship than permanent termination; workers still 
have a good chance of getting their old jobs back, the commu-
nity tax base does not leave, and local businesses continue to 
supply goods to the plant and many of its workers. Further, be-
cause the National Labor Relations Board has the authority to 
resolve strike and lockout disputes, their efforts need not be pre-
empted with an advance notice law. Finally, a business which 
relocates its plant within fifteen miles from the original location 
should not have to give notice. No harm will occur if workers are 
assured a job at the new location. Ideally, this exemption will 
encourage businesses to relocate nearby.121 
Subsection (b) makes it clear that this Act will not preclude 
workers and management from setting up a more far-reaching 
advance notice system than that required by law. With this reas-
surance, only the workers and the management's lack of creativ-
ity could stand in the way of an optimal adjustment program. 
C. Remedies for Violation of the Notice Requirements 
Section 4: Remedies 
(a) A business that did not give notice to a terminated 
employee as required under Section 2 of this Act shall be 
liable to that employee in the amount of fifty cents for 
each day that the business was required to give notice 
the military may force a business to close and move elsewhere even though the Congress 
has not declared a war. "Industrial sabotage" includes the case where the workers ruin 
the business' machinery so that production ceases. 
11
• Both federal bills previously mentioned, H.R. 565 and S. 1609, supra note 99, do 
not explicitly state under what conditions a business does not have to give notice, In-
stead, they delegate the authority of making exclusions to a new bureaucracy created 
within the legislation. Employing a bureaucracy to determine exclusions would only add 
to the cost of requiring advance notice. 
111 Unfortunately, H.R. 565, supra note 99, does not provide for this exclusion. How-
ever, the Employee Protection and Community Stabilization Act, supra note 99, does 
include this provision. 
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but for which the business did not give notice, times one-
twelfth the number of months the employee has worked 
at the establishment. 
(b) A business that did not give notice to the chief exec-
utive officer or elected body governing the community as 
required under Section 2 of this Act shall be liable to the 
community in the amount of $100 for every day the busi-
ness was required to give notice but failed to give notice. 
(c) · A business that did not give notice to the State [De-
partment of Labor] as required under Section 2 of this 
Act shall be liable to the state government in the amount 
of $100 for every day the business was required to give 
notice but failed to give notice. 
(d) An action to recover the liability under this section 
may be brought in any appropriate state or federal court. 
(e) The court may award a prevailing plaintiff reasona-
ble attorney's fees and the costs of the action in addition 
to any judgment. 
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The remedies section discourages complete violation of the 
law, provides some incentive for giving at least partial notice, 
increases the likelihood of enforcement, and allows direct com-
pensation to victims of a violation. Since a business which gives 
absolutely no notice may pay up to a million dollars111 in dam-
ages, the remedy discourages complete violation of the legisla-
tion. If a business decides to give notice sometime during the 
required period, the legislation rewards this effort to comply. 
The delinquent business can save around $5000 a day because of 
its sudden enlightenment. 1118 
This section also increases the likelihood of enforcement by 
letting victims bring suit. Justice might come slower and with 
less certainty with the government as enforcer.114 Finally, a rem-
edy should compensate the victims for the hardship caused by a 
violation of the advance notice law. Workers can use the money 
to pay suddenly burdensome bills, local government can use it to 
11
• This figure assumes the business is closing a plant of 1000 workers and the average 
seniority among those workers is 10 years. 
, .. See note 122 supra. 
,.. For example, in Britain and France, the agency delegated to enforce advance notice 
has not always lived up to its duty. See C & R Assoc. Studies of W. European Legisla-
tion, supra note 59, at 6, 24. 
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continue worthwhile programs, and the state can use it to pay 
overtime to employees who administered job assistance and un-
employment compensation programs.1211 
D. Passage of the Model Statute 
The proposed . statute is an effort to integrate the concerns of 
management, employees, and the community. Legislators could 
consider it alone or incorporate it into a more comprehensive 
plant closing bill. On its own, the statute would have a better 
chance at passage since more controversial plant closing reforms 
would not impede its legislative progress.118 Incorporated into a 
plant closing bill, the statute would play an essential role in eas-
ing the hardship of plant closings. 
Only legislators in the United States Congress should consider 
passing this statute. At the state level, legal battles may develop 
over the interstate commerce question, thereby delaying its en-
forcement. m Even worse, businesses in states that pass this law 
may flee to non-advance notice states.128 Such an event would 
, .. Neither of the major Jederal bills, National Employme~t Priorities Act, and Em-
ployee Protection and Community Stabilization Act, supra note 99, compensates the vic-
tims of a violation. 
118 See Freedman, supra note 20, at 18. 
117 Critics argue that the inability to relocate during the notice period, which restrains 
capital mobility, constitutes an interference with interstate commerce, violating the 
"dormant" commerce clause of the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Cook, 'Laws to Curb 
Plant Closings?, Indus. Week, Feb. 4, 1980, at 35, 36; GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 291-93. 
Advance notice, however, will only restrain capital if a business cannot foresee the need 
to close and relocate its plant. See notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text supra. Since 
decisions where to relocate and to construct the new facility take time, a business relo-
cating its plant must anticipate the closing of the old plant. 
Moreover, a violation of the interstate commerce clause occurs only when either the 
impact of the state law on interstate commerce is disproportionate to the expected bene-
fits, or when the local interest could be protected with less impairment of interstate com-
merce. See Arnold, supra note 84, at 251. An advance notice law should not have more . 
than a mininlal effect on interstate commerce given the time it takes to relocate. How 
minimal an effect advance notice will have on interstate commerce will of course depend 
on how long legislators make the notice period. A two year notice period might cause a 
lot of disruption of capital movement because some businesses will not know two years 
in advance that they want to relocate. A notice period of less than a year, however, would 
probably not cause disruption of interstate commerce because it takes time to find a new 
location and build a new plant. 
Advance notice also has many expected benefits. See notes 49-60 and accompanying 
text supra. The state, moreover, cannot protect its interest with less impairment of in-
terstate commerce because only with advance notice can alternatives to the plant closing 
be explored and a sound reemployment program developed. Consequently, state advance 
notice laws should not violate the interstate commerce clause. 
118 At the margin, any increase in costs of production within one state results in some 
businesses moving to states without those costs. Because an advance notice increases the 
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create the very situation the law seeks to prevent-employment 
loss. 
Finally, advance notice legislation is not a panacea for the 
plant closing problem. It does provide the opportunity to imple-
ment sound adjustment programs, but such legislation cannot 
provide the dedication, sensitivity, and spirit of cooperation 
needed to reemploy workers. Unless workers, management, and 
government officials work together to assure that the workers re-
main employed, advance notice may never bring about the bene-
fits it promises. 119 
CONCLUSION 
Plant closings have a devastating effect on workers and the 
community. Advance notice would help ease the attendant hard-
ships of a closing by providing time to explore alternatives. The 
statute proposed in this article preserves the benefits of advance 
notice while minimizing its costs. 
The recent debate over plant closing reform has pitted region 
against region, union against management. This seems unfortu-
nate. Closings occur all over the nation. 130 Whether the closing is 
caused by a business' desire to relocate or by its failure to make 
a profit, the suffering incurred by workers and their community 
cost of closing shop, some hUBinesses will avoid locating in states with advance notice 
laws. Cf. Kochan, supra note 6, at 19 (state plant closing laws will provide businesses 
with an incentive for locating in states without plant closing laws); Hekman & Strong, 
supra note 61, at 51 (bUBinesses will locate in states without plant closing laws). But cf. 
Kelly & Webb, supra note 12, at 55 (costs of plant closing laws are small, so businesses 
will not leave a state on those grounds); Schweke, supra note 69, at 35, 36 (no large 
corporation would make a major new investment in a state with a concern regarding how 
to leave twenty or thirty years later). 
' 19 See generally ETA Gums, supra note 32 (explains all the things employers, local 
government, unions, and employment service managers can do to help ease the effect of a 
plant closing from the time advance notice is given.). In addition to what is mentioned in 
the ·ETA Guide, employers should set up a network to exchange ideas on smooth shut-
down procedures and create indUBtry job listings and indUBtry arranged hiring. The fed-
eral government should: (a) generate data on the number of plant closings, their causes, 
the number of jobs lost becaUBe of closings, ~d the costs and benefits of various adjust-
ment programs, (b) coordinate committees within each industry to determine the opti-
mal advance notice period, severance pay scheme, training programs, and other adjust-
ment strategies for _that indUBtry, (c) provide incentives for relocating plants within the 
same area, and (d) provide funds to employees and communities to buy plants that can 
make a profit but which are closing. These measures should substantially improve 
America's response to plant closings. 
180 See, e.g., BLUBSTONB & HAmusoN, supra note 3, at 49 (manufacturing plants with 
over 100 employees closed in every region of the country; surprisingly, the highest 
probability of closing was reported in the South). 
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is equally catastrophic. Regionalism, therefore, serves no useful 
purpose in this debate. 
Union versus management squabbles over plant closing reform 
seem equally useless. If America hopes to revitalize its produc-
tion capabilities to compete with Japan and West Germany, 
workers must obtain the emotional security of plant closing ad-
justment programs.131 Unless workers receive the emotional se-
curity from such programs, they will seek security in protection-
ism and opposition to technological improvement. 181 In the long 
run, protectionism and technological obsolescence will only lead 
to fewer jobs and fewer profits. 
Management, labor, and communities from all regions must 
work together to achieve a rational, fair policy to deal with the 
effects of plant closings. National legislation requiring advance 
notice is a good way to begin the effort. 
-Joseph A. Cipparone 
111 See Drucker, supra note 46, at 28; McKersie, 'Plant Closed-No Jobs' (Contin-
ued), Acaoss THE BOARD, November 1980, at 12, 15. 
111 See Kochan, supra note 6, at 10. 
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APPENDIX 
Section I: Definitions 
As used in this Act: 
(1) "Business" means any commercial or industrial en-
terprise having an establishment within a community for 
more than five years. 
(2) "Close" or "Closing" means a permanent reduction 
of not less than 90% of the highest number of employees 
working at an establishment during the last twelve 
months. 
(3) "Community" means the lowest level of general lo-
cal government jurisdiction in which the establishment is 
located. 
(4) "Employee" means anyone employed within an es-
tablishment for at least thirty hours per week. 
(5) "Establishment" means all factories, plants, busi-
ness offices, or other working places at one location or 
several locations within a single community. 
(6) "Intermittent Employment" means employment 
that is not customarily carried on continuously through-
out the year. 
(7) "Involuntary Closing" means (1) any closing pursu-
ant to ·a court order or (2) any closing caused by fire, 
flood or natural disaster, a national emergency, acts of 
war, civil disorder, industrial sabotage, termination of 
lease, or proceedings in bankruptcy. 
(8) "Short-term Layoff'' means the cessation of employ-
ment for reasons other than the closing of the 
establishment. 
(9) "Termination" means the discharge of an employee 
due to the closing of an ~stablishment. 
Section 2: Notice Requirement 
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(a) Except as provided in (b), a business that intends to close 
an establishment at which have been employed at least 100 but 
not more than 499 employees at some time during the last 
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twelve months, shall provide the notices prescribed by subsec-
tions (c) and (d) at least ninety days before the termination of 
any employee. 
(b) A business that intends to close an establishment at which 
have been employed: 
(1) at least 500 employees at some time during the last 
twelve months; 
(2) at least 100 employees at some time during the last 
twelve months and that number of employees is larger 
than the number of employees working in any other com-
mercial or industrial establishment within the commu-
nity on the date that the business had its largest number 
of employees in the l~t twelve months, 
shall provide the notices prescribed by subsections (c) and (d) at 
least 180 days before the termination of any employee. 
(c) Written notice shall be given to: (1) each employee, (2) the 
chief executive officer or elected body governing the community, 
and (3) the State [Department of Labor]. Notice may be given 
by first class mail or personally delivered. 
( d) The notice to an employee shall contain the expected date 
of the employee's termination, the reasons for the closing, the 
benefits and services provided to employees by the business, and 
a description of the plans for closing the establishment. The no-
tice to the chief executive officer or elected body governing the 
community and the -notice to the State [Department of Labor] 
shall contain the name of the business, the location of the estab-
lishment, the expected termination date of the employees, the 
reasons for the closing, the number of employees that will be 
terminated because of the closing, a general description of the 
soon-to-be terminated employees' skills, and a description of the 
plans for closing the establishment. 
Section 3: Exclusions 
(a) This Act does not apply to: 
(1) an involuntary closing of an establishment; 
(2) intermittent employment, short-term layoffs, or the 
discharge of employees due to strikes or lockouts; and 
(3) a business that moves its operations to another es-
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tablishment within fifteen miles of the original establish-
ment and provides terminated employees work at the 
other establishment within thirty days after the closing. 
319 
(b) This Act does not affect the right of employees to longer 
notice as specified in a collective bargaining agreement. 
Section 4: Remedies 
(a) A business that did not give notice to a terminated em-
ployee as required under Section 2 of this Act shall be liable to 
that employee in the amount of fifty cents for each day that the 
business was required to give notice but for which the business 
did not give notice, times one-twelfth the number of months the 
employee has worked at the establishment. 
(b) A business that did not give notice to the chief executive 
officer or elected body governing the community as required 
under Section 2 of this Act shall be liable to the community in 
the amount of $iOO for every day the business was required to 
give notice but failed to give notice. 
(c) A business that did not give notice to the State [Depart-
ment of Labor] as required under Section 2 of this Act shall be 
liable to the state government in the amount of $100 for every 
day the business was required to give notice but failed to give 
notice. 
(d) An action to recover the liability under this section may be 
brought in any appropriate state or federal court. 
(e) The court may award a prevailing plaintiff reasonable at-
torney,s fees and the costs of the action in addition to any 
judgment. 

